影子银行业务的诱惑

显示全部楼层 · 发表于 2019-6-14 00:04:51

MARK CARNEY, governor of the Bank of England and head of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), an international watchdog set up to guard against future financial crises, was recently asked to identify the greatest danger to the world economy. He chose shadow banking in the emerging markets. Shadow banking certainly has the credentials to be a global bogeyman. It is huge, fast-growing in certain forms and little understood—a powerful tool for good but, if carelessly managed, potentially explosive.

日前，英格兰银行行长兼金融稳固委员会（一个为防范未来金融危急而设立的国际羁系机构，简称FSB）主席马克·卡尼曾被要求指出天下经济的最大威胁。他的选择是存在于新兴市场中的影子银行业务。影子银行业务具备成为一个举世性怪物的资格，这是毫无疑问的。它们不但个头巨大，躯体某一部门的发育特殊灵敏，而且还很少能被熟悉清晰——管理恰当，它们就是一种强大的工具；管理不妥，它们就是潜伏的炸弹。

The FSB, which defines shadow banking as lending by institutions other than banks, reckons it accounts for a quarter of the global financial system, with assets of $71 trillion at the beginning of last year, up from $26 trillion a decade earlier. In some countries, shadow banks are expanding even faster: in China, for instance, they grew by 42% in 2012 alone.

FSB将影子银行业务界说为非银行类机构的贷款举动。据它测算，影子银行的业务量占举世金融体系的四分之一，它们持有的资产的代价，已经从十年前的26万亿美元，上涨至客岁年初的71万亿美元。在一些国家中，影子银行的扩张速率乃至比这个还要快、比方，在中国，它们仅在2012年一年，就实现了业务量42%的增长。

But there is disagreement about what counts as shadow banking. The core is credit (everything from China's loan-making trust companies to Western peer-to-peer lending schemes and money-market funds). A broader definition, however, would include any bank-like activity undertaken by a firm not regulated as a bank: think of the mobile-payment systems offered by Vodafone, the bond-trading platforms set up by technology firms or the investment products sold by BlackRock.

但是，在怎样界说影子银行业务方面，是存在着分歧的，争论的焦点是信贷（指的是从提供贷款的中国信托公司到西方的P2P贷款子目和货币市场基金所从事的统统金融举动）。然而，如果把范围再扩大一点，凡是类似于银行业务但却是由不像银行那样担当羁系的企业所作出的举动，都可以算作是影子银行业务。比方，由沃达丰提供的移动付出体系，由技能企业设立的债券交易业务平台，或是贝莱德出售的投资产物。

As our special report explains, services like these are proliferating because orthodox banks are on the back foot, battered by losses incurred during the financial crisis and beset by heavier regulation, higher capital requirements, endless legal troubles and swingeing fines. The banks are retrenching, cutting lending and shutting whole divisions. In America, for instance, investment banks are no longer allowed to trade on their own account, only on behalf of clients. British banks, meanwhile, have slashed their loans to businesses by almost 30% since 2007, with Barclays this week confirming plans to shed up to 14,000 staff. Shadow banks are filling these gaps.

正如我们专题报道所表明的那样，类似于如许的服务正在灵敏繁殖。究其缘故起因，盖因在金融危急期间因丧失惨重而遭受打击的传统银行正处于守势之中，迫于羁系包袱的愈发极重，资源金要求的日益进步，法律诉讼的无休无止和罚款金额的不停增长，传统银行都在紧缩开支，淘汰贷款，乃至是整个部门整个部门地关闭一些业务。比方，在美国，投资银行已经不能再使用自营账户举行交易业务，只能是代表客户举行交易业务。与此同时，英国的银行不绝都在消减针对商业部门的贷款，这部门贷款量自2007年以来已经淘汰了30%，而巴克莱银行也已于本周证实确消减14000名雇员的操持。影子银行正在弥补这部门空缺。

Frailty, thy name is bank
; F( Q: l4 d$ F }3 {银行，你的名字叫“衰弱”

Nobody is too worried by competition to banks in their ancillary businesses: if, say, Google can help people manage their money more efficiently, that is to be welcomed. The argument is about credit. In some ways, it is a good thing that lending outside the banking system is expanding. Banks are regulated for a reason: they have big “maturity mismatches” (borrowing money largely for short periods while lending it out for the longer term), enormous leverage and are tangled up in complicated ways with other financial institutions, so they are especially fragile. And when they get into trouble, taxpayers tend to end up on the hook, because governments both guarantee deposits and are frightened to let such big and complicated institutions fail. So if some lending is moving from banks to less dangerous entities, the financial system should be safer.

没有人会对发生在银行副业范畴中的这种竞争太过担心。比如说，如果谷歌可以大概资助人们更高效地理财，谷歌的这种举动就是受欢迎的。争论紧张是围绕着“信贷”睁开。从某种角度来看，银行体系之外的贷款举动正在增多，这是一件功德。银行之以是要担当羁系，是由于以下这个缘故起因：他们有大量的“限期错配”（就是说，它们乞贷的时间，多以短期合约为主；而在贷款时，又多以恒久合约为主）和巨大的杠杆，而且还同其他金融机构之间形成了错综复杂的关系，因此他们黑白常脆弱的。同时，当他们遇到贫苦时，由于政府既要掩护储户，又畏惧让云云巨大和云云复杂的机构倒闭，纳税人就通常会成为受害者。因此，如果某些贷款业务正在由银行转向不那么伤害的实体，金融体系应当会更安全。

For these reasons, Mr Carney should be happier if, say, a British brewer takes a long-term loan from a pension fund or a life insurer with long-term liabilities instead of from a bank. If the loan goes wrong, the creditor will lose money, but without the gelignite of leverage, the elaborate web of counterparties and the depositors demanding their money now, losses in one institution are less likely to damage others.

鉴于以上这些缘故起因，如果某家英国啤酒厂商，从有着恒久应付任务的养老金基金大概寿险公司，而不是从银行那里担当了一笔恒久贷款，卡尼应该对此感到更高兴。这是由于，如果这笔贷款出了标题，赔钱的将是债权人。但是，由于这些债权人没有使用杠杆，他们之间也不存在错综复杂的关系网，也没有储户向他们要钱。因此，一家机构的丧失是不大有大概给其他机构造成打击的。

Yet shadow banks, if poorly regulated, can be just as dangerous as the better-lit sort. One of the principal culprits in the financial crisis was the “structured investment vehicle”, a legal entity created by banks to sell loans repackaged as bonds. These were notionally independent, but when they got into trouble they pulled in the banks that had set them up. Another source of instability were money-market funds, through which firms and individuals invested spare cash for short spells. These had been thought of as risk-free. When it became apparent that they were not, they suffered a run.

然而，如果羁系不力的话，影子银行就大概如能身于明处的银行一样伤害。作为金融危急的一大罪魁罪魁，“布局性投资工具”是一种由银行创造出来用以出售被再次打包成债券的贷款的合法实体。从理论上讲，它们是独立的。但是，一旦遇上贫苦，它们会把创设它们的银行也拉下水。另一个不稳固的根源是，企业和个人借以将自己的闲置资金举行短期投资工具而使用的货币市场基金。它们曾一度被以为是没有风险的。当他们不是没有风险这一毕竟变得日趋显着时，它们会遭遇银行挤兑式的赎回。

China's dark money% f; u+ y) q- s1 w
中国的陋规

The disaster taught regulators useful lessons. The shadow banks that caused the biggest problems had either big maturity mismatches or not enough capital to absorb losses. Most troublesome of all were those whose difficulties infected the banks, because the banks had either lent them money or had provided them with a backstop of some kind. Not surprisingly, the shadow banks that were created solely to take advantage of a less exacting regulatory regime turned out to be just as fragile and dangerous as banks.

劫难教给了羁系者有用的履历辅导。引发最大标题标影子银行要么是持有大量的限期错配，要么是没有充足的资源金来吸取丧失，而此中最令人不安的，则是那些把自己的困难感染给了银行的影子银行，由于银行或是曾把资金借给过它们，或是曾为它们提供过某种包管。当毕竟证实这些本着从较不严酷的羁系机构那里占自制的目标而创建的影子银行同传统银行一样的脆弱和伤害时，这丝绝不会令人感到希奇。

New regulations in many countries aim to make such shams impossible. Banks must now incorporate structured investment vehicles on their balance-sheets, for instance. Money-market funds must hold more liquid assets, to guard against runs. Limits on leverage have been imposed or are being considered for many forms of shadow bank.

许多国家羁系新政的目标就为了让此类弄虚作假的举动成为不大概。比方，银行如今必须要将其布局化投资工具归并至资产负债表中。货币市场基金必须持有更多的运动资产以防遭遇银行挤兑式赎回。针对杠杆的限定已经开始实行，针对各种各样的影子银行的限定也正在思量之中。

Yet as Mr Carney's anxieties suggest, the job of making shadow banks safe is far from complete. For instance, American regulators are still allowing some money-market funds to create the impression that an investor can never lose money in them. They should be forced to be more honest.

然而，正如卡尼所担心的那样，让影子银行变得安全的工作还远没有完成。比方，美国的羁系者仍在听任某些货币市场基金制造“投资者永世不会在货币基金中赔钱”的印象。货币市场基金应当被逼迫变得更诚实。

But the bigger danger lies in China, where regulatory arbitrage is happening on an alarming scale. Banks there are banned from expanding lending to certain industries, and from luring deposits by offering high returns. So they do both of these things indirectly, through shadow banks of various sorts. Meanwhile, some firms are setting themselves up as pseudo-banks: one shipyard makes a third of its money from finance (see article). It is hard to imagine that all the shadowy loans to unprofitable steel mills and overextended property developers will pay off. Yet investors are being encouraged to pile in by a series of bail-outs that have so far shielded them from most of the harm when such loans have soured.

但是，更大的风险是在羁系套利举动正以惊人的规模而发生的中国。在那里，银行是被克制向某些特定行业发放贷款的，而且还被克制以高额回报来勾引储户。因此，该国的银行在做这两件事时，都是以间接的方式、通过各种各样的影子银行来举行的。不但云云，该国另有一些企业把自己定位于假造银行的脚色：一家造船厂须要用钱，它可以大概使用集资得到三分之一的资金。全部那些被发放给不红利的钢铁厂和过分扩张的房地产开辟商的影子贷款未来可以大概被偿照旧不可思议的。只管云云，受一系列到如今为止能让他们不会由于贷款已经变质而受到伤害的接济举动的鼓励，投资者仍在而将大量资金投入此类贷款。

This is a crisis in the making. It will not bring China down—the government can use state-owned banks to temper its effects, and it has enough cash to spend lavishly to set things right. But it could still cost a lot. The sooner the regime spells out which assets are protected, the sooner investors will take more care about risk. Shadow banking can make finance safer, but only if it is clear whose money is on the line.

这是一场正在酝酿中的危急。它不会拖垮中国。这不但是由于中国政府可以大概使用国有银行来低落其影响，而且还由于中国政府手中有充足的现金可供他们浪费，以扭转局面。但是，影子银行仍旧会让他们付出代价。中国政府早一天表明确哪些资产是受掩护的，投资者就能早一天把精力更多地用于防范风险上面。影子银行能让金融变得更安全，但是这只有在搞清晰谁的钱正处于伤害之中的环境下才有大概。

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影子银行业务的诱惑

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