IT COULD be said that any financial system that appears to berobust will, in time, reveal some underlying rot. In the late 1990s, forinstance, the Asian financial crisis appeared to confirm the virtues of London and New York—then the global financial crisis happened.
" n% `; N- A1 }* s可以说任何看似繁荣的金融市场都会在某一天袒暴露深层的腐败（大概说金玉其表，败絮此中）。好比说，上世纪90年代末的亚洲金融危急涌入了大量来自伦敦和纽约的资金流，但紧接着就发生了金融危急。3 T) \8 g+ V2 Y
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Anyone who is overly impressed with the apparent resilience of China todaywould do wellto read a new book by two bankers who have worked there for many years, Carl Walterand Fraser Howie. “Red Capitalism” avoids the standard approach to Chinese analysis, which uses mounds of macroeconomic data that even Chinese regulators acknowledge are replete with flaws. Instead, the authors examine how China’s financial system has grown from pretty much nothing three decades ago into the dynamic, bewildering and possibly doomed set of institutions that fill the landscape today., {* k3 e$ ?2 m6 U0 e7 r
中国外貌上对金融危急顺应力极强，对此印象颇深的人大概该读读一本新书，作者是两个在中国工作多年的银行业者—CarlWalter卡尔·沃尔特和Fraser Howie弗雷泽·豪伊。“赤色资源”（暗指国有资源）未算入官方统计数据，证监会自己也认可这部分宏观经济数据标题很多。但是，本书作者过细研究了中国金融体系怎样从30年前（改革开放）一无全部发展到现在的繁荣情况。大概正是令人疑惑的政策作育了本日的中国股市。, c4 p) y1 S; J" E$ v1 \
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The book is, in many ways, a story of remarkable progress. In 1974 a delegation to the United Nations led by the future Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping, almost never left home because there wasn’t enough cash in the banking system—the entire Chinese banking system—to pay for the delegates’ plane tickets. Conditions worsened even further after that. By 1978, when Mr Deng returned from yet another political exile to assume power, China’s formal financial system had shrunk to a single institution, the People’s Bank, whose head office was made up of 80 people buried within the Ministry of Finance.
3 G, q$ N, q: h8 m) z1974年，由未来中国向导人邓小平向导的代表团赴美，他们险些从未脱离过中国，由于中国银行体系（整个中国银行体系）拿不出富足的钱付代表团的飞机票。随后的一段时间，中国经济状态更差了（文革）。到1978年，邓小平三起三落伍重回中心向导团体，其时，中国的金融体系缩水到只剩一个央行，而央行的中心机构只有80个人，他们从属于中心财政部。: P" B- ~" f4 e- k" T
3 b. W0 A0 ^$ B6 y b- I# bSkipping ahead, China now has more dollars than it can spend and its financial system is populated by a constantly expanding array of institutions. This is no accident. As “Red Capitalism” describes, it was Mr Deng’s goal, pursued with the vital support of his immediate successors, President Jiang Zemin and Prime Minister Zhu Rongji, who pushed through changes that were thoughtful, often brutal, and sometimes mistaken.
. B: N5 L; [$ Z4 d大跨步的发展后，现今中国持有的美元凌驾花出去的美元，而中国的金融体系也随着机构扩大而扩大发展。邓小平同道的目标—鼎力大举扶持“赤色资源”（当局资源），由下一届向导人江泽民主席和总理朱镕基继续。他们在推行改革方面成效甚大，常常是本领倔强，偶然也有些错误。% S" J6 `6 R: {; C
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China’s system opened with a bang in 1979. During the decade that followed, it created 20 banks, 745 trust companies, 34 securities firms, and 180 pawn shops, the authors have calculated. The consequences were disastrous and led to a radical clean up. During the 1990s hundreds of financial institutions tied to local governments were closed, along with Guangdong International Trust & Investment Corporation (GITIC), the second-largest non-bank financial institution. Losses were huge both inside and outside of China, and in the ensuing credit tightening, the collateral damage was not limited to the malign and the corrupt. Many jobs were eliminated. Growth in pivotal Guangdong province slowed and business on Hainan Island was brought to a virtual standstill by a real-estate bubble, now once more a problem.
2 L+ R7 q% {& v2 X0 a; V0 W7 o% x中国的金融体系在1979年审慎创建。接下来的十年，按规划创建了20家银行，745个信托公司，34家保险公司，180个典当行。效果是劫难性的，随后导致了狂风扫落叶式的清场。在整个20世纪90年代，数百家与当局接洽精密的金融机构关闭，包罗GITIC广信—广东国际信托投资公司，第二大非银行金融机构。境内境外债务均非常高，在确保信贷紧缩时，附带侵害不光是企业受创和停业，还会淘汰就业。经济大省广东的经济增长减慢，海南企业也由于房地产市场泡沫故步自封，现在又“昨日重现”了。广东国际信托投资公司（简称广东国投），于1980年7月经广东省当局答应创建，1983年经中国人民银行答应为非银行金融机构并享有外汇谋划权，1989年被国家主管部分确定为天下对外乞贷窗口。80年代末期，广东国投从单一谋划信托业务发展成为以金融和实业投资为主的企业团体。公司的告急高层向导有董事长邱长云，总司理麦智南等。 广东国投停业时的资产总额214.71亿元，负债361.65亿元，资产负债率168.23%，资不抵债146.94亿元。鉴于其资产负债非常严峻，省高级人民法院1999年1月公布该公司停业。这是中国首宗非银行金融机构停业案，也是天下法院迄今为止受理涉及财产金额最大的停业案件。1 F( l0 t& }, ?7 E( V
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Despite the evident pain, reform continued. Obstructive institutions and ministries were crushed or reconfigured; crooked party members jailed. Bit by bit, the standard components of modernity were put into place, including stock, bond and commodity markets, asset management and credit analysis.
1 l7 O, e5 Y1 Z* Y5 f只管体无完肤，改革照旧继续了。取消大概整理拦截改革的机构，羁系违法乱纪的党员。当代化的尺度机构一步步设立:包罗股票，债券，商品市场，资产管理和光荣分析机构。$ C; c% P8 ~3 M8 l2 y
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The process culminated in 2005 and 2006 with public listings in Hong Kong of China’s three largest banks. By that time, however, President Jiang and Prime Minister Zhu had already been out of office for two years and a key ally for reform, Vice Prime Minister Huang Ju, was terminally ill. With their departure went the willingness of the top leadership to endure the brutal volatility of market-oriented systems, and that, in turn, weakened the push for a floating currency, independent pricing of debt and other securities and international access to China’s capital markets. The appetite for turning financial institutions into real commercial operations disappeared also.2005和2006年间，金融市场改革取得成效，中国三大银行在香港上市。但其时，江泽民主席和朱镕基总理已离任两年，改革的告急同伴副总理黄菊重病。告急向导的离任增强了向导团体克制市场导向体系的大幅颠簸的意愿，他们的克制又削弱了浮动钱币，独立的债券和股票定价，以及外国资源涉足中国资源市场的大概性。让金融机构按照真正的贸易运作模式的想法也就没了。: H, l5 |$ f/ ^( H
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Reform was relegated to an expanding number of squabbling bureaucracies. China’s new senior leaders, having risen, unlike their predecessors, during years of strong growth, were concerned less with the threat posed by a stunted financial system than with widening income disparities and the possibility of social unrest. Their aims shifted to social goals, notably achieving a “harmonious society”. As a result, China’s financial reform stalled and the country has never truly opened itself up to the world. Foreign firms hold trivial amounts of domestic financial assets (under 2%), and play only a marginal role in any domestic sector.3 t8 Q! L8 u0 V0 I
金融机构改革变为大批五花八门的官僚机构的涌入。与他们的先辈差别，中国新上任的高官们在中国经济增长的年份里，并不怎么关心金融体系僵化和日渐扩大的大众收入差距，以及大概的社会动荡带来的威胁，他们只经心全意寻求“调和社会”的瞩目结果。因此，中国的金融机构改革停步，中国从来没有真正的对外开放。外国公司只占据国内金融资产的零头（低于2%），在任何一个国内部分都只是个小脚色。# |0 [6 V; m# w ?% B
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There have been some advantages in this. Chinese banks were not, in the main, exposed to toxic Western debt and, perhaps more importantly, never adopted dangerous Western methods of hiding risks. But China’s own approach presents these problems in a different form.
{+ y+ N* h9 b* }& A中国金融体系近况也有优点：中国的银行业根本上就对外开放了，向西方信贷敞开，更告急的是他们从来不采取西方的有潜伏伤害的做法。但中国自己的方法显现出的的标题各式各样。
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: L) @6 f3 ]" p9 k' \; A! P2 |3 NTo the extent that risk has been distributed, it is largely from state-controlled banks to other state entities in increasingly arcane ways. This distorts external perceptions of China’s solvency. State debt appears to be quite low by international standards (just under 20% of GDP) but when all government obligations are lumped together, the authors reckon it is actually 76%.
v9 R0 ?7 a9 c1 }, f就已经浮现的伤害来说，大部分是来自于从国家控股银行到其他国有企业的神机密秘的运营方式。外界对中国偿付本领的错误认识。当局债务以国际尺度来看很低（只占GDP20%），但是作者盘算当全部的当局债务汇总时，毕竟上到达了GDP76%。
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: x, Y L' ^ ?4 ^+ W& B4 U' zThe bigger problem, though, is that the system trades almost entirely with itself. Critical information about liabilities and pricing is deliberately concealed or impossible to discern; there are no outside entities establishing prices by bidding in the market. That undermines efficient capital allocation and allows excesses to fester.
x8 m" t' I- J; S5 m2 T' X这可真是个大标题，只管中国的金融机构是在同自己做交易，关键的数据如债务和定价都被审慎地取消了大概根本让外人无从得知，也没有外来力气在市场中竞标创建定价。如许的做法就削弱了有效的资源设置，使得伤口腐败。（忽然想起了《《扁鹊见蔡桓公》中的“讳疾忌医” 扁鹊曰：“疾在腠理，汤〔tàng〕熨(wèi)之所及也；在肌肤，针石之所及也；在肠胃，火齐(jì)之所及也；在骨髓（suǐ），司命之所属，无怎样也。今在骨髓，臣是以无请也。”）1 D; ~% ^0 y$ X' Z
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Many officials are aware of this, but conflicts of interest get in the way of resolving the problem. As the book details, the whole business of providing, receiving and regulating money involves one state entity or another. It may be in China’s overall interest for the system to open itself up, but doing so would pit the government against itself. That will not happen without commitment from those on top.
; Q& t3 t S* p+ h! Q很多官员都意识都了这些标题，但办理标题涉及到各种优点辩说。在本书的细节中，发行﹑接纳和规范钱币的一整套体系包罗了一个当局机构和其他的机构。开放中国金融市场大概符合中国的团体优点，但是开放了就会使政深陷于同自己尴尬刁难的田地。除非高层作出答应，否则中国的金融市场开放是不大概的。2 \& Q4 H$ D4 Y
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“Red Capitalism” shines an unprecedented light on a remarkable effort to build a system that appears to be comprised of sophisticated companies and markets. But the book also shows that a more primitive system, with vices as well as virtues, lives behind this façade. There is enough in “Red Capitalism” to provide China bulls with facts to justify enthusiasm for all that has changed, and yet still leave them wary of the future.
G: w+ X4 q* T% F; G1 ?“赤色资源”（当局资源）如同红星照中国一样平常对中国金融市场有着举足轻重的影响，而金融市场看起来是由复杂的公司和市场构成的。本书也展示了一个简朴的体系：林子大了什么鸟都有。“赤色资源”（当局资源）足以向中国牛市提个醒：对中国发展的结果要稳得住，（不应“既得志，则纵情以傲物”—谏太宗十思疏《旧唐书·魏徵传》）同时留意未来的伤害。（安不忘危？） |
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发表于 2019-6-13 23:29:08